The French Expedition to Ireland – December 1796 to January 1797

For three weeks at the end of 1796, the fates of Britain and Ireland hung in the balance, as one of the most serious threats ever mounted to British control of that island played out on the Irish coast. This was ‘the turning point that failed to turn’, a mixture of incompetence and heroism on both sides, in which the weather played a deciding role.

Background

The French plan to defeat Britain by invading Ireland had origins in earlier wars, but in 1796 it was the brainchild of the brilliant 28-year-old General of Division Lazare Louis Hoche, who conceived and planned the expedition. The ruthless Hoche and his senior officers expected to trigger a revolution in Ireland that would overthrow British rule and welcome the French liberators. Theobold Wolfe Tone, the founder of the United Irishmen (an underground movement promoting Irish independence) was travelling with the expedition and had the ear of its commanders. He had enthusiastically been canvassing support in Paris with a promise that at least a quarter of a million of his countrymen would respond to a call to arms. The French authorities could see the huge benefits of expelling the British from Ireland, not only in opening a second front against the old enemy, but also by allowing French warships the opportunity to control the Western Approaches and disrupt British trade.

Nevertheless, the confidence of Hoche and his officers was not shared by their counterparts in the Brest Fleet, which would transport and supply the invading French army. Morale was low, worn down by defeat at the Battle of the Glorious First of June in 1794 and losses in a disastrous winter cruise at the end of that year. The fleet’s elderly commander, Vice-Admiral Justin Morard de Galles had only recently been released from prison on the death of Robespierre and was not in good health. Even though his appointment to command the Brest Fleet had been engineered by Hoche, the general pitied the admiral, describing him as having aged 20 years from his time in prison.

General Hoche

There had already been a series of delays to the dispatch of the expedition, and now in early December the weather conditions would be much less favourable than they had been a few months earlier. However, Hoche was determined to get underway as soon as was possible. This haste meant that the fleet was unable to include some planned reinforcements. Six sail of the line from Rochefort under the command of Rear-Admiral Josef de Richery that had eluded Rear-Admiral Sir Roger Curtis and slipped into Brest, required repairs following their recent campaign against the Newfoundland fisheries. Five of the line and three frigates under the command of Rear-Admiral Pierre-Charles de Villeneuve that were expected to join the invasion fleet were still in passage from Toulon . Despite the absence of these ships, the French invasion fleet destined for Ireland under the command of Morard de Galles, still consisted of 17 ships of the line, 14 frigates and corvettes, and 26 other vessels including 20 transports. Aboard the ships was an army numbering 21,400 men , troops that had become available following Spain’s recent transformation from enemy to ally.

Getting out of Brest in the face of the blockading British squadron was the first challenge. After exiting the narrow entrance to Brest harbour, Morard de Galles planned to avoid the enemy by turning south to reach the Atlantic through the Passage du Raz, where the British would not be patrolling. After the two to three-day voyage to Ireland, the navy was then to land the troops in Bantry Bay, a long narrow inlet running northeast from the Atlantic Ocean. Once he had landed the troops, Morard de Galles was under orders to return the fleet to Brest, leaving just a few frigates at Hoche’s disposal.

French Departure from Brest

On the night of 15 December, the first division of the fleet filtered through the narrow Goulet Channel, which a corvette illuminated with rockets and blue lights, coming to anchor at daylight in the rock-strewn Camaret Bay to await the remainder of the fleet. At midday on the 16th, under a gentle sun, the assembled ships started to move southwards towards the rocky Passage du Raz as planned, but as they did so the wind began to strengthen. At 4 p.m., with night coming on, Morard de Galles changed his mind and signalled his fleet to instead reach the Atlantic by sailing directly westward, through the much broader Iroise Passage. However, some of his captains failed to see the signals or were unsure about what to do and maintained their original southward course.

Commanding the British Inshore squadron off Brest was the famous Captain Sir Edward Pellew of the Indefatigable 44; under him were the frigates Amazon 36, Captain Robert Carthew Reynolds, Révolutionnaire 38, Captain Francis Cole, and Phoebe 36, Captain Robert Barlow. A friendly Breton fisherman had previously advised Pellew that the French were embarking troops in Brest, and after dispatching the Phoebe to alert Vice-Admiral John Colpoys who commanded the squadron stationed off Ushant, Pellew now determined to disrupt the expedition’s departure. Sailing the Indefatigable in among the French fleet in the darkness, Pellew launched rockets, hoisted lights, and fired signal guns of his own, interfering with Morard de Galles efforts to use these same methods to signal the change in course. As a result, the French fleet ended up sailing in several groups rather than as a coherent force, and the frigate Fraternité 40 carrying the two commanders (Hoche and Morard de Galles) became separated from the rest of the fleet. During the mayhem, the Séduisant 74 drove ashore on the Grand Stevenet near the head of the Passage du Raz with the loss of nearly half of the thirteen hundred men aboard, including her captain, M. Dufossey. Pellew, having helped disrupt the exit of the French, stayed in contact with the enemy as they made their way slowly towards Ireland. Having heard nothing from Colpoys, he detached his remaining frigate, the Révolutionnaire, to look for the vice-admiral on the 16th. A day later he lost sight of the expedition, and so he sent the Duke of York lugger off to Falmouth to warn the Admiralty that the French were at large and that their destination was unknown.

Confusion among the British

Admiral Morard de Galles

Phoebe’s search for Vice-Admiral Sir John Colpoys, commanding the force guarding Brest, was initially unsuccessful, since Colpoys’ thirteen ships of the line had been blown far west of their usual station off Ushant by easterly gales. When Barlow finally found Colpoys on the 19th, the vice-admiral had to decide how to respond to his unwelcome news. He was now far to the southwest of Brest; although Colpoys had previously expressed the opinion that if the French force escaped, they would head for Ireland, he nevertheless decided to return to his post off Brest in order to intercept the enemy fleet on their return. The main part the British Channel fleet under Admiral Lord Bridport, the recently ennobled Alexander Hood, remained at Portsmouth, too far away to be able to immediately influence events well to the west. Upon the government receiving the initial reports on 19 December that the French were out, Bridport was summoned to the Admiralty from his home in Somerset where he spent much of his time ashore. That same day his second-in-command, Vice-Admiral Sir Alan Gardner, who was already in London and not in the best of health, set off for Portsmouth to take a squadron to sea in search of the French.

Back on the coast of France, Pellew, consumed with anxiety and fury at the non-appearance of the Channel Fleet, had decided to sail for Falmouth himself and spread the news of the French expedition, although by the time he reached the Cornish port on the 20th, his earlier dispatch had already been delivered to the Admiralty advising that the French were at large. For his part, Colpoys did sight French warships, but these were Villeneuve’s reinforcements coming up from the Mediterranean, which he was able to force into Lorient on 23 December. A day later, one of his squadron, the ex-French Impetueux 80, Captain John Willett Payne, which had lost touch with the other ships in a fog, passed so close to the French invasion fleet that she saw a rocket signal.

At Spithead what can only be described as a shambles was now unfolding. Upon his arrival at Portsmouth, Sir Alan Gardner was too ill to go aboard his flagship and so he remained ashore to convalesce. Lord Bridport did get aboard his flagship, the Royal George 100 at Portsmouth on the 23rd, but further time was lost in preparing to sail. When on Christmas Day the fleet attempted to put to sea in a gale and heavy snow, there was almost as much confusion as the French fleet had experienced at Brest nine days earlier. The Prince 98, Captain Thomas Larcom, collided with the Sans Pareil 84, Captain William Browell; the Atlas 98, Captain Edmund Dod, drove aground on the Mother-Bank; and the Formidable 98, Captain Hon. George Berkeley, fouled the Ville de Paris 110, Captain Walter Locke. Then the weather worsened – temperatures in London fell well below zero, and a strong easterly wind forced the fleet at Spithead to remain at anchor. To compound matters, on 31 December Colpoys arrived at Spithead with six sail of the line, having become separated from the remainder of his squadron. His unexpected arrival immediately scotched optimistic reports in the newspapers that he was in pursuit of the French and would surely bring them to account.

At this stage the government was still wrestling with several possibilities as to the French expedition’s destination — they had been aware of the preparations, but the French had assiduously spread a variety of rumours: the force could be used for a descent on Saint Domingue (modern Haiti), or to undertake an attack on Portugal in co-operation with their new Spanish allies, and the Paris newspapers had reported that its destination was to be Vigo in Spain. The first firm news of its objective came from the Irish station itself, which was under the command of Vice-Admiral Robert Kingsmill at Cork. A sloop, the Kangaroo, Commander Hon. Courtenay Boyle, had been out on patrol on 21 December when she had sighted the French expedition steering for Bantry Bay. After promptly informing Admiral Kingsmill, Boyle had been dispatched to Plymouth to alert the home government, but the awful weather delayed his passage. It was not until 1 January 1797 that he reached the Devonshire port, by which time one of the Kangaroo’s lieutenants who had earlier been put ashore at Cork had already reached the Admiralty with the news that the French were off the Irish coast. On 3 January 1797 the Channel Fleet at last got to sea. Armed with the intelligence of the French descent on Ireland, Bridport sailed into Bantry Bay on the 9th to find an empty anchorage. Not a single enemy soldier under arms had been landed.

Sir Edward Pellew

French Failure in Bantry Bay

Most of the scattered French fleet had managed to rendezvous off Cape Clear to the east of Bantry Bay, on 19 December, although the Nestor 74, Cocarde 40, Romaine 40, and three brigs and two transports had become detached in a thick fog. Crucially, the frigate Fraternité, carrying Hoche and Morard de Galles, was also missing. The poor weather prevented the fleet from reaching the entrance to Bantry Bay until the morning of the 21st, and even then, only some of the vessels were able to enter and anchor. The bitter snow-carrying easterly winds prevented the two senior officers present, Rear-Admiral Francois Joseph Bouvet and General of Division Emmanuel Grouchy, from disembarking the troops from those ships in the Bay. The two commanders planned to land six thousand men on Christmas Day, but a violent storm on Christmas Eve made the landing impossible. As the weather worsened, many of the ships, unable to remain at anchor, were forced out to sea. With stores running low, Bouvet and Grouchy abandoned the enterprise on the 26th and departed for Brest. Bouvet had intended the remaining ships in the Bay to follow him back to France, but most did not receive the signal. Instead, they stayed anchored in the Bay another day. Then nine ships under Commodore Jacques Bedout sailed, intending to rendezvous off the River Shannon for a possible new attempt at a landing. After waiting vainly for the rest of the fleet, on the 30th this small force set course for Brest. Meanwhile another squadron of French ships (four of the line and four frigates carrying several thousand troops) that had failed to enter the Bay on the 21st, had finally managed to enter the inlet on the 29th, and anchored while their leaders decided what to do.

The Fraternité, which since becoming detached from the fleet had been chased to the westward for several hours by a British frigate, neared her intended destination on the 30th. Outside the Bay the flagship met the Révolution 74, Captain Dumanoir Le Pelley, as she skilfully removed the crew of the sinking razée Scévola 44. When Dumanoir informed the two commanders of the failure of the attempts to land in Bantry Bay over the previous week, Morard De Galles and Hoche concluded that there was now no chance for the expedition to succeed. Since the Révolution was damaged from a collision, and carrying over 2,000 men, they decided that the Fraternité would escort the unseaworthy vessel back to France. Thus, they missed meeting the French force then in the Bay, which despite a period of calm weather, failed to land any troops. On 5 January, the eight ships weighed anchor, cruising fruitlessly off the south coast of Ireland for a few days before returning to Brest.

James Gilray’s take on the failed French invasion.

Unfortunately for the demoralised, weather-beaten, desperately overcrowded French fleet, the Scévola was not the only ship to be lost. On 30 December the Impatiente 44 was wrecked near Crookhaven on the south-western tip of Ireland with 500 men aboard — only 7 survived. On the same day one of Admiral Kingsmill’s cruisers, the Polyphemus 64, Captain George Lumsdaine, captured the transport Justine. Over the next two weeks, roaming British warships picked off individual French ships, which were often carrying large numbers of troops. On 5 January, the Polyphemus captured the frigate Tartu 40 with 660 crew and troops to the west of Cape Clear (the captured vessel would later be bought into the navy to become the Uranie). The Ville de Lorient 36 armed ‘en-flute’ and carrying 450 hussars as well as supplies was captured on 7 January by the frigates Unicorn 32, Captain Sir Thomas Williams, Doris 36, Captain Hon. Charles Jones, and Druid 32, Captain Richard King. At about the same time the transport Fille-Unique foundered, and the storeship Suffren was sunk by several British men-of-war off Ushant. On 8 January the Doris and Unicorn were pursued by returning ships of the French fleet — they might have been captured had two further enemy which were in sight on the other bow joined the pursuit. These two ships, which kept their distance, were in fact the Fraternité and the Révolution. On the 10th the Atalante 16 was taken by the Phoebe off the Scilly Islands, and on the 12th the storeship Allegre became a prize of the Spitfire 16, Commander Michael Seymour, off Ushant. The Surveillante 36 was scuttled on the 13th after earlier grounding in Bantry Bay with many of her men being taken prisoner, whilst the busy Unicorn and the Doris took the corvette Eclair 18 on the 16th. Typically, it was Sir Edward Pellew who would have the last word, and it could not have been more dramatic, for on 13 January the Indefatigable and the Amazon drove the returning Droits d l’Homme 74 ashore in Audierne Bay with a loss of life that eventually totalled over a thousand men.

The remainder of the French force was to make it home in dribs and drabs. On 1 January, the first wave under Rear-Admiral Bouvet returned to Camaret Bay, consisting of his flagship Immortalité 40, the Indomptable 80 (carrying the unhappy Wolfe Tone), Mucius 74, Fougueux 74, Patriote 74, and Redoubtable 74. Upon his arrival, Bouvet was immediately suspended from duty. Ten days later the Constitution 74, Trajan 74, Pluton 74, Wattignies 74 and Pégase 74 came in, with the latter towing the Résolue 40 , and on the 13th the Nestor 74, Tourville 74, Eole 74 and Cassard 74 entered port. All the other frigates reached Brest in the early days of January bar the Bravoure 40, which found sanctuary in Lorient, whilst the Fraternité and the Révolution eventually got into Rochefort on the 14th.

Aftermath

Having failed to intercept the French, and after detaching Rear-Admiral Sir William Parker with five sail of the line to reinforce Admiral Sir John Jervis in the Mediterranean, the Channel Fleet under Lord Bridport returned to Spithead on 3 February. Ironically, the only admiral to have got anywhere near the French had been Vice-Admiral Sir George Keith Elphinstone, whose flagship, the Monarch 74, forced into Bantry Bay by the weather on his return voyage from the Cape, had been close enough to the French to hear their signal guns out to sea.

With the threat of invasion over the recriminations began. How could a large French fleet of warships and transports operate unhindered for nearly a month on the doorstep of the Royal Navy without being detected, let alone attacked and destroyed? Notwithstanding Curtis’ earlier failure to intercept de Richery, it was Bridport and Colpoys who were to face the most criticism. Few commentators could understand how the Channel Fleet, whose job was to blockade Brest, had failed to keep the French in port, attack their ships as they came out, or even find the struggling French on their return. Bridport was castigated for his loose arrangements, for failing to provide Colpoys with a force at least equal to the Brest fleet, for not using Torbay near Plymouth as an anchorage from where he could get his capital ships to sea at short notice, and for the time he had taken in getting to sea once news had been received that the French were at large. Speculation suggested that he would face a court martial, or even that he might seek one on himself to clear his name, but this did not happen.

The disapproval directed at Colpoys was even more intense, for at least Bridport had the benefit of being a popular officer whilst his subordinate was not. The vice-admiral’s failure to prevent de Richery’s entrance to Brest and then to bring the French invasion fleet to account would never be forgiven, even though there were mitigating circumstances. The appalling winter weather had dispersed his squadron and deprived him of his patrolling frigates, there was general uncertainty over the expedition’s destination, and Bridport had not provided him with enough ships to maintain an effective blockade. The defence that, given his ignorance of its destination, he had been correct to await the Brest fleet’s return to port was ridiculed by opponents of the government. They sarcastically asked whether the best way to prevent an invasion of Ireland was to remain off the French port after the enemy fleet had already departed. In particular however, it was the common seamen who reserved the most opprobrium for Colpoys, and within months, when a mutiny took hold in the fleet, he would be unfairly labelled a ‘base coward’ for his failure to tackle the French expedition.

Surprisngly two large objects survive from this tale of storm and mischance. An anchor lost in Bantry Bay by a French ship (perhaps the frigate Surveillante) now graces the square in the town of Bantry. Even more remarkable is a French longboat that belonged to the frigate Résolue. When the frigate lost a mast due to a collision in the Bay, one of her lieutenants was sent in the boat to find another ship that could tow the Résolue to safety. The boat was driven ashore in the bad weather, the crew captured, and the undamaged vessel kept by the local landowner as a prize of war. The longboat is now displayed at the National Museum of Ireland, Museum of Decorative Arts and History, in Dublin. Of the 30,000 soldiers and sailors who set out from Brest to invade Ireland, Lieutenant Proteau and his dozen crewmen were the only Frenchmen to set foot on the Emerald Isle.

French fleet:
1 x 80 guns: Indomptable
16 x 74 guns: Redoubtable, Patriote, Eole, Trajan, Cassard, Nestor, Pluton, Fougueux, Mucius, Droits de l’Homme, Tourville, Wattignies, Constitution, Séduisant, Pégase, Révolution:
14 Frigates: Scévola 44, Fraternité 40, Cocarde 40, Immortalité 40, Impatiente 44, Tortue 40, 40, Bellone 40, Surveillante 36, Sirène 36, Bravoure 40, Fidele 40, Romain 40, and Charente 36.

Vice-Admiral Colpoys Squadron:

Channel Fleet that left Spithead on 3 January 1797:

*These ships were detached with Rear-Admiral Parker to the Mediterranean Fleet.